

Nations would be of enormous political impact on the people of Iran. A ban on selling Iran refined petroleum products would dislocate its economy and bring enormous popular pressure on the Government of Iran, because although Iran exports petroleum, it doesn't have the refining capacity—and therefore is dependent on imports for almost half of its gasoline.

So how do we get these very extreme U.N. Security Council sanctions? Only with a dramatic change in Russia's policy.

Now, our current approach to securing that critical Russian support has been very ineffective, and we have achieved only token sanctions that Tehran can laugh off.

The only way to get the kind of Russian support we need is by offering real changes on our policy toward issues in Russia's own geographic region—issues Russia cares a lot about, issues not of great significance to most of us in the United States. Our efforts to convince Russia to change its Iran policy only because, well, they ought to do it, have been remarkably unsuccessful. We need to address Russia's concerns to change their policy toward Iran's nuclear weapons.

In particular, we may need to offer to make modest changes in our policies towards such issues as the Russian-speaking peoples of Moldova, Latvia and Estonia, the route of Caspian Sea oil pipelines, and Chechnya and Abkhazia.

Now, the State Department bureaucracy is prejudiced towards this approach for three reasons: First, a bureaucracy has bureaus, and they have got an Abkhazia bureau that doesn't want its interests sacrificed for some more important national security priority. Second, there are those in the administration with such an almost faith-based excessive estimate of our national power. They think we can achieve all of our national objectives and that we don't have to sacrifice or delay any of them. Finally, many of America's foreign policy experts grew up in the Soviet era. They spent their time strategizing how to encircle and weaken Russia. And, Madam Speaker, old habits die hard.

Nothing is more important to America's national security than an all-out diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. MORAN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. MORAN of Kansas addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. SCHIFF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PENCE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. PENCE addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

RECOUNTING REASONS FOR VOTING IN FAVOR OF 2002 RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of today, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATERS) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Ms. WATERS. Madam Speaker, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the President began talking about going to war with Iraq. In the fall of 2002, with the midterm elections heating up, the President increasingly talked about the threat Iraq poses to the United States and its allies. On October 10, 2002, the House voted on H.J. Res. 114, the Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq resolution. It passed the House by a vote of 296-133: 215 Republicans voted for the resolution, 6 voted against it. 81 Democrats voted for it, and 126 voted against it.

Madam Speaker, in light of what many of our Members know today, they perhaps would not have voted for that resolution. As a matter of fact, day in and day out as I talk with my colleagues, they recount all of that which was told to us by the President of the United States and others on the opposite side of the aisle, for the most part, about why it was so important to go to war with Iraq.

They told us there were weapons of mass destruction. They told us that the troop levels that they were sending were necessary. They told us about the cost of the war. They told us that oil revenues would be paying for the reconstruction. They told us we would be greeted as liberators. They told us we would be able to contain sectarian violence.

Well, Madam Speaker, I have colleagues that are here this evening who will recount perhaps some of what they were being told and the way they trusted the Commander in Chief, they trusted our President. They were concerned about the safety and the security of our Nation.

So we have with us tonight some of the brightest, most hardworking, most respected Members of the Congress of the United States. They are going to remind us of what we were being told and how they came to their decision and what they are thinking now.

Leading that discussion will be my dear friend from Missouri, that is my hometown, my birthplace, who I have gotten to know very well. He is the Chair of one of the most important committees of this House, the Armed Services Committee, a highly respected gentleman, Representative IKE SKELTON.

I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, I thank my friend originally from Missouri for yielding this time.

Last year, I had the opportunity to visit the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. After a ceremony there, I went into the library, and in the glassed-off section for old and rare books I found a book printed in 1926 about the 1915 British misadventure at Gallipoli, entitled "The Perils of Amateur Strategy." I have often thought regarding the situation in Iraq that we face today that this administration is not giving food for thought to some author to write a book entitled "The Perils of Amateur Strategy II."

The issue before us this evening is what would we have done, had we known what we know today. Had that been the case, we probably would never have had a resolution before us, much less voted in favor of it.

We have a wonderful military, the finest we have ever had and the finest in modern history. The young men and young women are dedicated, they are professional and they are volunteers, whether they be active duty, whether they be National Guard or Reserve. Gosh, I am proud of them. I have been with them aboard ship; I have been with them in their training. I have been with them in Iraq and Afghanistan and had the privilege of spending Christmas Day with them in Baghdad. But I wonder where all of this ends.

They moved the goalposts on us. The first goal was to make sure that weapons of mass destruction were not there, then to establish a democracy, and now to bring stability to Iraq. And those goalposts keep moving.

I am truly concerned about where we have been and much more concerned about where we go in Iraq. Whatever happens there, and I feel that there is no positive outcome for this, the star of this show will be the young men and young women who wear the uniform of the United States. History will treat them well and our gratitude should go toward them.

There are some mistakes that are made that are irretrievable. There have been such mistakes that we have made in Iraq. The first, of course, was going in with the intelligence that at least was available, not having a plan in use, despite the fact that there was a plan available. Lieutenant General Jay Gardner asked for the people to help draw it up and was finally given one person from the State Department. But the plan was not allowed to be used.

Looting was allowed, and then we dismissed those who belonged to the Baathist Party, who made the trains run and the local government run. Some thousands of school teachers were put out of jobs. Then the army was dismissed, rather than giving them a paycheck and a shovel and the opportunity to help bring security and stability to that torn country.